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Maintaining Client Privacy in an Increasingly

Public World
Mel M. Justak & Anne-Marie Rhodes*

-

Individuals have long been interested in protecting their private
family and financial matters from broad public disclosure. Motives vary,
of course, but can range from safety concerns to saving certain family
members from public embarrassment that could jeopardize future business and social opportunities.1 While motives may have changed little
over time, the urgency to protect privacy is more pronounced in today's
world. 2 For example, 100 years ago the primary vehicle for wide dissemination of news - including a family's or individual's private matters
was newspapers. While disclosure through this medium could certainly
be embarrassing, the disclosure would be the result of journalistic and
editorial processes and, even then, limited to the circulation of the newspaper. In today's digital age, with widespread ownership of smartphones
and the 24/7 news cycle, public disclosure of private information can be
virtually instantaneous, global in scope, and without procedural safeguards. Further, bad actors have an ever-expanding toolbox for committing a growing list of financial and cyber-crimes with the information
that could be disclosed. With these rapidly developing threats in mind,
client families may have a heightened interest in maintaining privacy for
themselves and their loved ones.
This article will review some traditional techniques estate planners
use for maintaining client privacy and how the protections those techniques provide may be eroding as developments in the law intersect with
the interest of client privacy. Additionally, the article will explore techniques and best practices families could employ to maintain a balance
* Mel Justak is a partner in the Chicago office of Reed Smith LLP and chair of its
Private Clients Services group. Anne-Marie Rhodes is John J. Waldron Professor of Law
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and an ACTEC Academic Fellow. The au-

thors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Rachel Sierminski, J.D., Loyola
University Chicago 2021.
1 See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 555, 583-84

(2008).
2 Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, No. 19-251 (U.S. Jul. 1, 2021) (noting
the risks associated with public disclosure of personal information "are heightened in the
21st century and seem to grow with each passing year.").
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between transparency to beneficiaries and the protection of family privacy with respect to third parties. 3
I.

TRADITIONAL TOOLS - TRUSTS AND LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES

As most planners know instinctively, trusts are frequently-used
tools to achieve efficient tax planning, creditor protection for beneficiaries and, importantly, maintain client privacy. Trust agreements are
generally not filed in court unlike a will. 4 A settlor can use a name for
the trust that does not reveal the identity of the settlor or any member
of the settlor's family. Because a trust agreement is usually kept from
public view, a settlor's trust may address sensitive family issues like children with drug, alcohol or gambling issues. Estate planners have come
to expect that trustees need only to provide proof of a trust's existence
and of the trustee's authority to act in order to open a bank account or
sign a contract. 5 While non-grantor, non-charitable trusts are separate
taxpayers and file their own tax returns, like individuals, those returns
are subject to strict federal confidentiality protections. 6
Entities such as corporations and limited liability companies
(LLCs) provide limited liability protection for their owners and are
available to be formed under the laws of each of the fifty states. Many
businesses throughout the country form one or more entities under
these statutes in connection with starting their operations. Individuals
and families also use entities like LLCs to purchase or hold real estate
or other assets to help shield the identity of the owners of such assets.7
For example, when one purchases real estate, the identity of the grantee
and the grantor appear on the face of the deed, which is a public record.
3 It is important to note that some advocate for fuller disclosure of financial information. See, for example, Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71
ALA. L. REv. 981, 1016 (2020), arguing that extreme financial secrecy can shift "tax bur-

dens from high-wealth families to ordinary- and low-income families, helping to fortify
'rising inequality' and 'creat[ing] a threat to democracy itself."'
4 See Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the DigitalAge, 94 N.C. L. REv. 927,

946-47 (2016) ("Privacy is one of the most compelling reasons to have a revocable trust
instead of a will.").

5 Historically, the practice was different. For example, because a third person making payment to a trustee could be held liable for a trustee's misapplication of funds,
"[t]he result was careful scrutiny by the third persons of the terms of the trust." David M.
English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisionsand Policy Issues, 67 Mo.

L. REv. 143, 208-09 (2002).
6 See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 7213 (discussing federal rules governing the confidentiality and disclosure of returns and return information, and the unauthorized disclosure of information).
7 See Bradford S. Cohen & Alexander L. Bruin, Achieving True Privacy for Public
Figures Through Privacy Trusts, L.A. LAw., May 2019, at 22, 25, preferring privacy trusts
to LLCs for personal residences.
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If either or both parties to the deed are LLCs, then those LLC owners
are not easily identifiable from the deed if a third-party manager or officer has authority to sign public record documents on behalf of the
LLC. Further, in certain states, including Delaware 8 and Wyoming, 9 the
Certificate of Formation or Articles of Organization, as the case may be,
need not identify the LLC's manager or any member who may act as
manager. Therefore, a properly formed and administered LLC allows
families to add extra layers of privacy protection. In some instances,
families may even form multiple layers of LLCs to add additional liability protection and further privacy protection. For many, the use of trusts
and LLCs provide a degree of privacy that allows individuals to own
assets and provide for their families free from public knowledge of the
underlying owners or the terms on which the assets are held for those
individuals.

II.

TRENDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS

The use of trusts and LLCs to help protect individuals' privacy is
generally a result of state law. Important privacy-serving policy goals,
however, are increasingly intersecting with geopolitical changes and
technological advances in committing and fighting financial crimes. In
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Congress
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot)
Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001; hereinafter the "Patriot Act") as
a tool to combat money laundering activities in an attempt to cut off
funding sources for suspected terrorist organizations.1 0 The Patriot Act,
among other things, required the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe
regulations setting forth the minimum standards for financial institutions and their customers regarding the identity of the customer that
shall apply in connection with the opening of an account at a financial
institution."" In response to the Patriot Act and subsequent regulations
(now commonly known as "know your customer" or "KYC" regulations), many financial institutions became more insistent on requiring
review of complete copies of trust documents when trustees sought to
open accounts for the trusts they administered.1 2 Many customers com8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(e) (2021).
9 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-201(a), (c) (2021).
10 See USA PatriotAct, ODNI, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organiza
tions/ise/ise-archive/ise-additional-resources/2116-usa-patriot-act [https://perma.cc/U45J3HWV]; see also PatriotAct, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patri

ot-act (Aug. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W8P4-N6H7].
11 31 U.S.C. § 5318(1)(1).
12 Jennifer Lowe, What is KYC and Why Does it Matter?, PLAID (Aug. 12, 2021),

https://plaid.com/resources/banking/what-is-kyc/ [https://perma.cc/W8KX-KCDH].
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plied with these requests, but others pushed back citing privacy concerns. This led sometimes to awkward conversations with financial
institutions and their clients for what many viewed as the simple act of
opening a checking account for a trust.
Around this same time, the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") was beginning to be enacted at the state level. Although the Uniform Law
Commission approved the UTC as of August 4, 2000 - over a year prior
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and enactment of the Patriot Act - Kansas
was the first state to enact the UTC in 2002.13 When the iPhone was
released in 2007, only 19 states and the District of Columbia had enacted the UTC.14 As of July 1, 2021, 35 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UTC and legislation has been introduced in New
York. 15
In developing the UTC, transparency to beneficiaries was an original guiding principle. 16 UTC section 813 provides that the trustee "shall
keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about
the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for
them to protect their interests." 17 The trustee's duty to inform and report specifically includes the duty to provide: (i) to a beneficiary upon
request, a complete copy of the trust instrument,1 8 and (ii) to the trust's
qualified beneficiaries, the current trustee's contact information,1 9 notice of the trust's existence, of the identity of the settlor or settlors, of
the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to a
trustee's report of the trust's property, liabilities, receipts and disbursements, 20 advance notice of any change in trustee compensation, 21 and
accountings. 22 While the UTC provisions are mostly default rules that
13 See Trust Code, UNF. L. COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/com-

munity-home?CommunityKey=193ff839-7955-4846-8f3c-ce74ac23938d
5Y7A-WVES].
14 Id.
15 See id.

[https://perma.cc/

16 It was, however, also highly controversial. See, e.g., UNW. TR. CODE § 105(b)(8)(9) (UNIF. L. COMM'N, amended 2010). In 2004 the UTC amended those sections by
bracketing them, indicating they were no longer mandatory. See infra note 24.
17 UNIF. TR. CODE § 813(a).
18 Id. § 813(b)(1).
19 Id. § 813(b)(2).
20 Id. § 813(b)(3), (c).
21 Id. § 813(b)(4).
22 See id. § 813(c), which provides in pertinent part that, "[a] trustee shall send to
the distributees or permissible distributees of trust income or principal, and to other qualified or nonqualified beneficiaries who request it, at least annually and at the termination
of the trust, a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and amount of the trustee's compensation, a listing of the trust assets and,
if feasible, their respective market values."
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can be modified by a trust instrument, to underscore the importance of
beneficiary transparency, UTC sections 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9) as originally enacted in 2000 provided the duty to notify qualified beneficiaries
over age 25 of the existence of the trust, the identity of the trustee, and
their right to request trustee's reports, as well as the duty to respond to a
qualified beneficiary's request for trustee's reports and other information reasonably related to the administration of a trust, may not be
waived.23 The mandatory nature of this reporting requirement generated significant backlash. In 2004, the UTC amended the two provisions
by bracketing them, signaling they were no longer mandatory. 24
While the UTC drafters originally defaulted to transparency with
respect to beneficiaries, they were careful not to expand disclosure to
third parties. UTC section 1012(b) provides that in dealing with a trustee, a non-beneficiary who is acting in good faith "is not required to
inquire" about the trustee's powers and the propriety of their exercise.
Consequently, "there is no need to request or examine" the trust.25 Further, UTC section 1013 allows the trustee to provide a certification of
trust to a third party in lieu of providing an entire trust agreement. 26
The certification of trust would provide only certain trust information
including the trust date and a representation that the trust still exists, 27
the identity of the settlor and trustee, 28 the trustee's powers, 29 whether
the trust is revocable or irrevocable and who has the power, if any, to
revoke the trust, 30 and the trust's taxpayer identification number. 31 To
underscore the point, the section explicitly states the certification of
trust need not contain the dispositive terms of the trust 32 yet allows for a
third party to demand the trustee furnish copies of trust excerpts
designating the trustee and showing the trustee's powers. 33 Understanding that third parties may hesitate to deal with a trustee if they are with23 Id. § 105(b)(8)-(9).
24 See id. § 105 cmt. (stating that by placing sections 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9) in
brackets, this will signal that uniformity is not expected); see also Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIz. STATE L. J. 713,

761-62 (2006).
25 UNIF. TR. CODE § 1012 cmt.
26 English, supra note 5, at 152. "To protect the privacy of the trust, a procedure is

"

provided whereby [third parties] may verify [the] authority by means of a certificate ....
See also UNIF. TR. CODE § 1013 cmt., noting that the section adds "another layer of
protection."
27 UNT. TR. CODE § 1013(a)(1).
28 Id. § 1013(a)(2)-(3).
29 Id. § 1013(a)(4).

30 Id. § 1013(a)(5).
31 Id. § 1013(a)(7).
32 Id. § 1013(d).
33 Id. § 1013(e).
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out the entire trust agreement for fear the withheld trust provisions may
show the trustee actually lacks authority for the transaction, the drafters
specifically provide that a third party who deals with the trustee in good
faith reliance on the certification of trust may enforce the transaction as
34
if the representations in the certification were correct. Because of this
protection for good faith reliance afforded by UTC section 1013, the
drafters attempt to deter those third parties from nevertheless demanding the entire trust agreement by making them liable for damages if a
35
court determines they did not act in good faith in making that demand.
Section 1013 seems a good compromise that addresses a third
party's need, on one hand, to confirm a trust's existence and the trustee's power to enter into a transaction, and a family's desire, on the
other, to keep dispositive provisions of a trust private. In practice, however, section 1013 may not provide the absolute protection individuals
seek to protect the sensitive provisions of trusts.
36
First, the UTC is not enacted law in all states. Second, in the
states that adopted the UTC, section 1013's provisions are not uniform.
Although the vast majority of states enacted section 1013 as proposed,
some states' statutes do not hold third parties expressly liable for demanding the entire trust agreement after being presented a certification
of trust. 37 Conversely, some states not only apply liability for damages
to such third parties but extend that liability to include costs and attorney fees. 38 Third, regardless of the extent of section 1013's reach, in order to receive any damage award (assuming one is available), a trustee
must bring a court action and secure a judgment that the third party
defendant did not act in good faith in demanding the entire trust agreement. As noted earlier, financial institutions are subject to federal antimoney laundering rules. It may be difficult to prove bad faith on a financial institution's part for merely taking a conservative position in its interpretation of those regulations. A more practical consideration is that
34 Id. § 1013(g).
35 Id. § 1013(h).
36 See Trust Code, UNIF. L. COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/com4 239 3
8d [https://perma.cc/
munity-home?CommunityKey=193ff839-7955-4846-8f3c-ce7 ac
5Y7A-WVES].
37 See FLA. STAT. § 736.1017(6) (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.860(9)(a) (2021);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-1013(d) (2021).
38 At least 11 states provide for attorney or legal fees, namely: Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and non-UTC
states California and Delaware. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-11013(H) (2021); COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 15-5-1013(8)

(2021); CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 45a-499zzz(h)

(2021); GA. CODE

ANN. § 53-12-280(g) (2021); IOwA CODE § 633A.4604(6) (2021); MIcH. COMP. LAws
§ 700.7913(8) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1013(8) (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.98.075(8) (2021); Wis. STAT. § 701.1013(8) (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE § 18100.5(h)
(West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3591(h) (2021).
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enforcement could be a costly affair. Therefore, a family should consider
the context of the third party's request for the entire document. If it's a
financial institution demanding the whole trust, would it be simpler just
to engage another financial institution that would accept the trust certification alone? If it's a third-party purchaser of trust assets requesting
the entire trust as part of its due diligence and no other buyer is available, perhaps the same protection could be achieved through a non-disclosure agreement that provides the buyer will not retain any copies of
the trust reviewed in connection with the transaction and shall keep all
provisions strictly confidential. As noted above, the deterrent effect of
section 1013 is limited but nonetheless, the authors' experience is that
many financial institutions will accept the trust certification for many
services, including relating to the opening of accounts. In fact, many of
the larger financial institutions that operate in multiple states have their
own trust certification forms they will accept in lieu of an entire trust
document.
Families' ability to use entities such as LLCs for privacy protection
may encounter obstacles similar to those encountered by trusts due to
recent changes in law. As part of the federal Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2020 that became law on January 1, 2021, Congress included the
Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). 3 9 The CTA includes new reporting
requirements for certain business entities, including LLCs, formed in
any state within the United States or that are registered to do business
in any such state.4 0 Specifically, the CTA requires the beneficial ownership of each domestic entity must be reported to the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network under the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(FinCEN).4 1 This is the heart of the CTA. FinCEN is directed to maintain the information submitted with respect to each entity for a period
of at least five years in a non-public, secure database.4 2 FinCEN may
only disclose the reported information upon request of certain law enforcement agencies and federal regulators under strict protocols.43
FinCEN is allowed, however, to disclose the reported information to
financial institutions requesting it for due diligence purposes if the re39 The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 is part of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116283, 134 Stat. 3388 ("NDAA"). The CTA is found at sections 6401-6403 of the NDAA,
with section 6403 adding section 5336 to Title 31 of the U.S. Code.
40 See Robert W. Downes et al., The Corporate Transparency Act - Preparingfor
the FederalDatabase of Beneficial Ownership of Information, A.B.A. Bus. L. SECTION

(Apr. 16, 2021), https://businesslawtoday.org/2021/04/corporate-transparency-act-preparing-federal-database-beneficial-ownership-information/ [https://perma.cc/2X7A-94LG].
41 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A).
42 See id. § 5336(c)(1).
43 Id. § 5336(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
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porting entity consents." The CTA also contains criminal and civil penalties for violations of the disclosure provisions. 45
The information to be reported for each beneficial owner46 of an
entity includes the full legal name, birthdate, current address, and either
a unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document or a special FinCEN issued identification number.47 The Secretary
of the Treasury is required to promulgate regulations implementing the
statutory provisions of the CTA within one year of its enactment (i.e., by
January 1, 2022) and the provisions of the CTA would take effect on the
date such regulations are finalized. 4 8 Any reporting company formed
prior to the effective date of the regulations must submit its reports of
information no later than two years after the effective date of the regulations. 49 Reporting companies will also have ongoing reporting requirements to report changes in beneficial ownership information (e.g., after
any gifts or sales of LLC interests). 50 As of July 1, 2021, no regulations
have been issued. It is, therefore, still unclear which entities must file
this information and when reporting companies must start reporting information to FinCEN.
Similarly, it is too early to determine whether the CTA will cause
families to rethink using LLCs as privacy protection vehicles to hold
assets. It appears the information to be reported to FinCEN for now is
basic identifying information. While the CTA takes pains to establish
strict confidentiality protocols to safeguard the reported information,
and limits the scope of disclosure of such information, some families
may now hesitate in using LLCs to avoid a reporting requirement and
appearing on a government database. Recent news reports discussing
51
federal tax policy that relied on leaked, confidential taxpayer data il§ 5336(c)(2)(B)(iii).
45 Id. § 5336(h)(3).
46 "Beneficial Owner" is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(3) but for purposes herein
generally means an individual who owns at least 25% of the entity or exercises substantial control over it (e.g., a manager of an LLC). A minor child, however, is specifically
excluded if the parent's information is reported. See id. § 5336(a)(3).
47 Id. § 5336(b)(2)(A).
48 See id. § 5336(b)(5).
49 See id. § 5336(b)(1)(B).
44 Id.

50 See id. § 5336(b)(1)(D). The report must be filed within one year of the change in

beneficial ownership information. Id.
51 See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger et al., The Secret IRS Files: Trove of Never-Before-Seen
Records Reveal How the Wealthiest Avoid Income Tax, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2021, 5:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seenrecords-reveal-how-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax [https://perma.cc/47KN-BY4S] (stat-

ing that tax data records obtained contain some of the nation's wealthiest people); see
also Justin Elliott et al., Lord of the Roths: How Tech Mogul Peter Thiel Turned a Retirement Account for the Middle Class Into a $5 Billion Tax-Free Piggy Bank, PRoPUBLICA
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lustrate that no confidentiality protocol is completely safe. An unfortunate corollary is that public confidence that government-required
information will not be misused is lessened by such reports, with skepticism especially sharp when leaks further a political or ideological end.
Finally, this new federal development may inspire the adoption of similar reporting requirements at the state level, where data protection protocols may not be as stringent.
III.

WHAT Now?

Given this erosion of privacy due to changes in law and technology,
families may think they need to accept that things change and adjust
their expectations accordingly. While maintaining privacy is more of a
challenge today than only 20 years ago, there are tools available for families willing to use them.
Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are one such tool, in addition
to LLCs and trust certifications. NDAs are a regular part of many commercial transactions and settlement agreements involving litigation of a
commercial or personal nature. 52 High-profile public figures and highnet worth individuals regularly use NDAs for business transactions as
well as for employees, household staff, and in premarital and divorce
agreements. 53 NDAs typically identify the information to be kept confidential and for how long. Many agreements provide for a return of any
confidential information at a specific point in time (e.g., at the termination of the relationship). This return of information provision is important and should include a prohibition from retaining copies of
information. An agreement could contain exceptions for retaining information for government investigations or other regulatory matters. Finally, NDAs can contain remedies for breach of the confidentiality
provisions, such as monetary damages and/or a specific performance
provision. Negotiating an NDA can be expensive; consequently, it may
not be cost effective for some situations. Yet, for families with privacy as
an utmost concern, an NDA can be a reasonable expense.
NDAs are private contracts that can be tailored to the parties'
goals. They are also highly contextual and flow from specific personal
and business relationships. 54 In the context of a family trust, both personal and business relationships may be in play. While trustees may seek
NDAs with any third party, seeking confidentiality with beneficiaries is
(June 24, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/lord-of-the-roths-how-techmogul-peter-thiel-turned-a-retirement-account-for-the-middle-class-into-a-5-billion-dollar-tax-free-piggy-bank [https://perma.cc/5379-35QL].
52 See Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Silence for Sale, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (2020).

53

See id. at 1112.
54 See id. at 1118.

74

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:65

more complicated. As discussed above, in some states, UTC sections
813, 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9) mandate that certain information must be
provided to beneficiaries. Trustees may legitimately be concerned with
what a beneficiary will do with information once received but (at least in
many UTC jurisdictions) it seems unlikely that the trustees could condition receipt of the information on the beneficiary's signing an NDA.
This is a situation where family communication and cooperation may
achieve a privacy policy - that all agree is in the family's best interest
- where a trustee could not.
As an example, consider a family office with a number of member
trusts governed under a UTC jurisdiction. The senior generation is
deeply concerned with privacy but knows the trustees owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries to provide certain information. The senior generation is committed to family meetings and open communication and
education with the junior generations. The topic of maintaining family
privacy among a defined group of individuals - such as direct descendants and spouses - could be another family mission statement point similar to open communication or commitment to philanthropy. Once
agreed to in concept, the mechanics of the policy could be implemented
by expecting family member beneficiaries to hold trust information confidentially. Alternatively, the beneficiaries could voluntarily agree to
sign NDAs as an indication of their assent to the philosophy. The policy
should require beneficiaries to receive consent before further disseminating the information to others for agreed-upon purposes (such as a
loan or premarital agreements) and only after that third party signs an
NDA. While there are practical complexities with this approach, they
should be navigable when approached like any other agreed-to family
value.
Taking this approach a step back in time, a trust settlor may consider including a confidentiality requirement in the trust. A beneficiary's
interest would be conditioned on the beneficiary keeping trust information private. This approach is novel and raises certain predictable questions. Most fundamentally, is such a provision valid? UTC section 404
provides a trust may be created "only to the extent its provisions are
lawful and not contrary to public policy." 5 5 If a settlor's stated intent is
to protect the privacy of trust terms and assets, is that "lawful and not
55 See UNwI. TR. CODE § 404 (UNiF. L. COMM'N, amended 2010). The Restatement
(Third) of Trusts similarly provides that a trust provision is invalid "only to the extent [its
provisions] are lawful [and] not contrary to public policy." Martin D. Begleiter, Taming
the "Unruly Horse" of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts, 26 QuiNiPIAc PROS. L. J. 125,
129 (2012). The Restatement is controversial; in particular, "the concept of public policy
in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts appears inadequate on numerous grounds." Id. at
135.
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contrary to public policy?" To the extent public policy is determined by
a governing state's laws, 56 we believe the answer is yes. State income tax
returns of individuals are not publicly disclosed. States do not routinely
require public dissemination of an individual's assets. Even if one enters
the public space through litigation, a process for sealing records filed in
court is available and increasingly granted for an individual's personal
financial data.57 Recently, some states reversed course and now allow
anonymity for their lottery winners because of safety concerns, deeming
the "individual privacy rights of a lottery winner outweigh the public's
right to know .. .. "58 The trend seems in favor of privacy for an individual's personal financial data. 59 A settlor-imposed privacy measure seems
consistent with this trend.
Moreover, when courts do strike conditions in wills and trusts on
public policy grounds, those cases primarily involve marriage and, less
frequently, destruction of property or wasteful expenditures.60 Maintaining a family's privacy involves neither.
A court determining public policy for a trust provision may, however, require an analysis as to its impact on the parties - particularly if
the breach involves a forfeiture of a beneficiary's interest as equity abhors forfeitures. 61 Consequently, in crafting a confidentiality provision,
56 See In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. 2009), noting that "[w]hen
we determine that our answer to a question of law must be based on public policy, it is
not our role to make such policy. Rather we must discern the public policy . . . as expressed in the constitution, statutes, and long-standing case law."

57 Dariush Adli, Sealing Celebrity Confidential Information as a Matter of Public

Interest, L.A. LAw., May 2019, at 18, 18-19, noting that "[o]ver the past two decades,
courts across the country have become more sensitive to privacy and reputational and
financial harm that indiscriminate public disclosures in court documents and other information may cause ... the pendulum increasingly has swung toward protecting sensitive
and potentially damaging information as courts increasingly recognize the potential danger in making such information public."
58 Conor Porter, Montana Passes Legislation to Allow Lottery Winners to Remain
Anonymous, LOTrERY DAILY (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.lotterydaily.com [https://
perma.cc/3AGJ-PHV7]; see also KY3 Staff, New Missouri Law Makes it a Crime to Re-

veal Lottery Winners, KY3 (June 29, 2021, 4:43 PM), https://www.ky3.com/2021/06/29/
new-missouri-law-makes-it-crime-reveal-lottery-winners/#:-:text=the %20new%201aw

%2C%20which%20takes,of%20as%20much%20as%20%242%2C000 [https://perma.cc/
Y7M2-F28P].
59 This is in contrast to calls for more disclosure when the NDAs concern sexual
misconduct. David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L.
REv. 165, 214-15 (2019).
60 See, e.g., In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. 1975); Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
61 See Benjamin N. Feder & Rebecca A. Levin, A Modern Look at the Enforceability of No-Contest Provisions, TR. & EsT., Nov. 2020, at 34, 35-37, discussing alternative

no-contest provisions, including litigation hold-back funds, but noting uncertainty of enforceability due to vagaries of public policy.
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a modification of the beneficiary's interest upon a breach of confidentiality is preferable to a termination of the interest. The type and scope of
the modification, of course, depends on the facts and circumstances. Reduction in an income interest either in time, amount, or percent may be
appropriate.
Determining the enforceability of a conditional gift in trust raises
issues similar to those of no-contest clauses. Although the lens of testamentary no-contest is tempting, there are two important differences. 62
First, in many testamentary no-contest cases, the underlying issue is the
will's validity due to capacity, undue influence or formalities, while in
trust no-contest cases, it is often the propriety of the trustee's conduct.
Excepting formalities, no-contest cases, therefore, are intent-serving,
not intent-defeating as would be the case in striking a privacy provision
of a competent settlor. Second, the statutory backdrop differs. The Uniform Probate Code provides a no-contest clause is unenforceable if
there was probable cause to contest, while the UTC is deliberately silent
on the issue. 63 This indecision suggests a greater role for upholding a gift
conditioned by a settlor on family privacy protections.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The need to protect a family's personal financial data has grown in
line with regulatory disclosure changes in the law and advances in technology. For estate planners, the traditional techniques generally retain
validity but are subject to new constraints. Confidentiality provisions,
whether voluntarily embraced by a beneficiary through an NDA or involuntarily imposed on such beneficiary through the trust itself, may be
an approach that effectively recalibrates the privacy-disclosure
continuum.

62 Deborah S. Gordon, Forfeiting Trust, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 505 (2015).
63 Id. at 501.

